

# **Defeating Forensic Analysis**

CEIC 2006 – Technical Lecture 1 Thursday, May 4 – 10:30 am to 11:30 am

Presented by Vincent Liu and Patrick Stach



# Welcome

### Vincent Liu

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- Researcher, Metasploit Project
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### Patrick Stach

- Director of Research and Development, Stach & Liu
- Researcher & Developer, Metasploit Project
- Former security industry developer and freelance consultant
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# **Agenda**

 Weaknesses in current forensic analysis tools and techniques

Metasploit Anti-Forensics Tools

 Specific recommendations on how to improve



# Rapid History

- Basic Utilities
  - touch
  - mv and rename
  - rm and del
- Repurpose Existing Technologies
  - ADS, encryption, Gutmann secure deletion (Eraser)
- Targeted Research into Anti-Forensics
  - Metasploit Anti-Forensics Project
  - Deflier's Toolkit
  - Conferences: BlackHat, BlueHat, ToorCon, and now CEIC



# **Defeating Timestamps**

- Technique
  - Examine timestamps for temporal locality
- Anti-technique
  - touch for UNIX & MAC in FAT
  - MACE in NTFS
    - timestomp.exe from the Metasploit Anti-Forensics Project
    - NtQueryInformationFile() and NtSetInformationFile()



# **Defeating Timestamps**

	Name	Last Accessed	File Created	Last Written	Entry Modified
210	Q329048.log	06/06/05 02:10:21AM	12/02/04 09:45:29AM	12/02/04 09:45:48AM	3/27/05 07:59:44PM
211	Q329115.log	07/11/05 04:48:15PM	12/11/04 11:15:20AM	12/11/04 11:15:23AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<u> </u>	Q329170.log	06/06/05 02:10:21AM	12/11/04 11:16:47AM	12/11/04 11:17:58AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<u> </u>	Q329390.log	06/06/05 02:10:21AM	12/11/04 11:15:08AM	12/11/04 11:15:10AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<u> </u>	Q329441.log	06/06/05 02:10:21AM	12/11/04 11:19:15AM	12/11/04 11:20:27AN	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<u>215</u>	Q329834.log	06/06/05 02:10:21AM	12/11/04 11:33:43AM	12/11/04 11:33:48A	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<u> </u>	Q329909.log	06/06/0 <mark>5 0 10:21AM</mark>	12/02/0 <mark>09:-5:07AM</mark>	12/02/1 09 / 5:27A 1	03/27/0 <mark>07:</mark> 59:44PM
<u> </u>	Q331953.log	06/06/ 02 0:21AM	12/02/04/09 6:34AM	12/02/4 /:45:55A 1	03/27/0 <mark>07:5</mark> 9:44PM
<u> </u>	Q810565.log	07/18/05 10:41:34PM	12/11/04 11:22:01AM	12/11/04 11:23:19A	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<u> </u>	Q810577.log	07/11/05 05:13:54PM	12/11/04 11:29:32AM	12/11/04 11:30:44AN	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
220	Q810833.log	06/06/05 02:10:21AM	12/11/04 11:28:17AM	12/11/04 11:29:29AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
221	Q811630.log	07/11/05 09:32:26PM	12/11/04 11:25:51AM	12/11/04 11:26:57AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
<u> </u>	Q811789.log	07/11/05 10:39:36PM	12/02/04 09:44:02AM	12/02/04 09:44:19AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
223	Q813862.log	06/06/05 02:10:21AM	12/02/04 09:46:57AM	12/02/04 09:47:17AM	03/27/05 07:59:44PM
224	Q814033.log	06/06/05 02:10:21AM	12/11/04 11:23:22AM	12/11/04 11:24:33AM	03,27/05 07:59:44FM

modified (M), accessed (A), created (C), entry modified (E)



# **Defeating EnCase**

### normal

AUTOEXEC.BAT	06/30/05 11:57:13AM	12/02/04 09:43:29AM	12/02/04 09:43:29AM	12/02/04 09:43:29AM
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• after setting values (-z "Monday 05/05/2005 05:05:05 AM")

AUTOEXEC.BAT 05/05	/05 05:05:05AM   05	5/05/05 05:05:05AM	05/05/05 05:05:05AM	05/05/05 05:05:05AM
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example EnCase weakness (-b)

AUTOEXEC.BAT				
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# **Defeating EnCase**

	Name	Last Accessed	File Created	Last Written	Entry Modified
<u> </u>	<b>I</b> \$UpCase	12/02/04 02:16:52AM	12/02/04 02:16:52AM	12/02/04 02:16:52AM	12/02/04 02:16:52AM
□ 15	<b>I</b> \$Volume	12/02/04 02:16:52AM	12/02/04 02:16:52AM	12/02/04 02:16:52AM	12/02/04 02:16:52AM
□ 16	3584 byte bob.txt	07/09/05 04:09:20PM	07/09/05 04:09:20PM	06/18/05 09:11:39PM	07/09/05 04:09:09PM
□ 17	AUTOEXEC.BAT				
<u> </u>	boot.ini	07/22/05 09:00:01AM	12/02/04 02:20:31AM	12/02/04 11:25:05AM	12/02/04 11:25:05AM
<u> </u>	CONFIG.SYS	01/17/05 11:48:45PM	12/02/04 09:43:29AM	12/02/04 09:43:29AM	12/02/04 09:43:29AM
<u> </u>	i DELL	07/20/05 02:37:53PM	12/02/04 09:47:17AM	12/02/04 10:07:18AM	12/02/04 10:07:18AM
<u> </u>	devicetable.log	07/08/05 03:54:12PM	01/11/05 09:45:55AM	07/08/05 03:54:12PM	07/08/05 03:54:12PM
<u> </u>	Documents and Settings	07/22/05 12:00:03PM	12/02/04 02:21:18AM	12/02/04 09:55:27AM	12/02/04 09:55:27AM
23	hpfr5550.xml	02/12/05 12:23:59AM	02/06/05 01:56:24PM	02/12/05 12:23:59AM	02/12/05 12:23:59AM
<u>24</u>	Install.log	06/06/05 02:11:04AM	04/18/05 09:02:35AM	04/18/05 09:02:36AM	04/18/05 09:02:35AM
<u> </u>	IO.SYS	12/02/04 09:43:29AM	12/02/04 09:43:29AM	12/02/04 09:43:29AM	12/02/04 09:43:29AM
<u>26</u>	legalese_l0_001.txt	07/19/05 01:31:43PM	03/29/05 04:19:12PM	03/29/05 04:19:12PM	03/29/05 04:19:12PM




# **Defeating EnCase**

	Name	Last Accessed	File Created	Last Written	Entry Modified
□ 62	ODBCINST.INI				
□ 63	iis5.log				
□ 64	comsetup.log				
☐ 65	imsins.log				
□ 66	ockodak.log				
□ 67	ocgen.log				
□ 68	mmdet.log				
□ 69	ModemDet.txt				
<b>70</b>	Blue Lace 16.bmp				
□ 71	Soap Bubbles.bmp				
<b>72</b>	Coffee Bean.bmp				
<b>7</b> 3	FeatherTexture.bmp				
□ 74	Gone Fishing.bmp				
<b>75</b>	Greenstone.bmp				
□ 76	Prairie Wind.bmp				
□ 77	Rhododendron.bmp				
<b>78</b>	River Sumida.bmp				
□ 79	Santa Fe Stucco.bmp				
□ 80	Zapotec.bmp				
□ 81	vb.ini				
□ 82	vbaddin.ini				
□ 83	COM+.log				
□ 84	folder.htt				
□ 85	desktop.ini				



# **Defeating MS Antispyware**





# **Defeating MS Antispyware**

### **Detailed File Analysis**

Display name: testfile.txt

Name: testfile.txt

Publisher: Unspecified

Path: C. Hackingtestrile.txt

📆e: 7 bytes

Create date: Wednesday June 29, 2005 Access date: Tuesday July 19, 2005

Modified date: Wednesday June 29, 2005

MD5: aezb1f0-515040-54545b2zu8ed95575

### **Detailed File Analysis**

Display name: testfile.txt

Name: testfile.txt

Publisher: Unspecified

Path: C:\Hackbirtheetfile.tut

Size 7 bytes

Access date: Tuesday July 19, 2005

MD5: ae2b1fca515949e5d54fb22b8ed95575



# **Defeating Windows**

# Live Windows Explorer Demo



# **Improving Timestamps**

Entry
Header

SI
Attribute
MACE

FN
Attribute
Attribute
Attributes
...

- Every file stores MACE values in more than one attribute!
- Standard Information (SI)
  - Currently used by EnCase and other tools.
- Filename (FN)
  - Not used by EnCase or other tools.



# **Improving Timestamps**



earlier time

later time



- MACE values always updated in SI.
- MACE values only updated in FN when a file is created and/or moved.
- 3. Therefore, MACE values from FN should always be older when compared to the SI values.



# **Anti-counter Anti-technique**

<b>Entry Header</b>	SI Attribute	FN Attribute	Other
<b>Entry Header</b>	SI Attribute	FN Attribute	Other
	•••	•••	•••

- Modify the Filename (FN) attribute
  - Calculate the offsets
  - Modify via raw disk I/O.
- Modify the Data attribute
  - Swap out the data.
  - Timestomp it back.




- Two Detection Techniques
  - File extensions
  - File signatures

- Anti-detection Technique
  - Change the file extension
  - Change the file signature




Signature	Hash Value	Name	File Ext	File Type
Match	4e65745d42c70ac0a5f697e22b8bb033	sdelete.exe	ехе	Windows Executable
Match	4e65745d42c70ac0a5f697e22b8bb033	sdelete-modified.exe	exe	Vindows Executable












Signature	Hash Value	Name	File Ext	File Type
Match	4e65745d42c70ac0a5f697e22b8bb033	sdelete.exe	exe	Windows Executable
Match	4e65745d42c70ac0a5f697e22b8bb033	sdelete-modified.exe	exe	Vindows Executable

# one byte modified


Signature	Hash Value	Name	File Ext	File Type
Match	4e65745d42c70ac0a5f697e22b8bb033	sdelete.exe	exe	Windows Executable
Unknown	a9fb4408297bb43ebc0a219d0d5a94f5	sdelete-modified		





	Name	File Ext	File Typo	Signature
<b>₹</b> 20	textfile.txt	txt	Text	Match
-				





	Name	File Ext	File Typo	Signature
<b>₹</b> 21	textfile.exe	exe	Windows Executable	Match




# **Improving Signature Analysis**

- Perform statistical analysis against headers & footers.
  - PE/ELF binary headers have a fixed format/structure.
  - Data for JPEG, GIF, and other have repeatable patterns.

- Perform file content analysis
  - Text files usually ASCII text.
- Open the file ©







- Technique
  - Identify known good files with hashing white lists and known bad files with black lists
  - Identify known bad files with hashing black lists
  - Examine the remaining files
- Anti-technique
  - Get off of the black list
  - Get on the white list



## 4e65745d42c70ac0a5f697e22b8bb033 eafcc942c7960f921c64c1682792923c







```
EXE header

if (collision == 0) {
    goto good
} else {
    goto bad
}

collision = 0

good

bad
```

```
EXE header

if (collision == 0) {
    goto good
} else {
    goto bad
}

collision = 1

good

bad
```

- We can generate hash collisions in MD4, MD5 (public)
- We can generate hash collisions in SHA1 (not public)



# Live Executable Collision Demo



# **Improving Hashing**

- Use only trusted hash white lists
- Don't rely on black lists to find bad files
- Perform bit-by-bit file comparisons
- Stack multiple hashing algorithms

http://www.stachliu.com/collision.html



# **Defeating Disk Analysis**

### Technique


- Capture everything on disk and analyze
- Capture list of active processes, open files, open ports, etc...

### Anti-technique

- Never touch the disk,
- Never open a new port
- Never open a file
- Never create a new process
- And so on...



# **Defeating Disk Analysis**





# **Defeating Disk Analysis**

### memory/Isass



disk

registry

# Meterpreter + sam juicer

### meterpreter channel

- 1. slides over Meterpreter channel
- 2. direct memory injection
- 3. never hits disk & never hits the registry
- 4. never starts a service
- data flows back over existing connection
- 6. failure doesn't leave evidence



# **Improving Disk Analysis**

- Capture live system information
  - Isof, netstat, dd, ifconfig
- Capture live memory information
  - memparser, kntlist, Windows Memory Forensic Toolkit
  - Immature technologies that can be subverted
- Use trusted external hardware to verify
  - CoPilot expensive, use on mission critical systems



# Technique


- Analyze the existing file system for information
- Look for file fragments in slack space

# Anti-technique


- Leverage an NTFS implementation oddity
- Avoid NTFS zeroing your data
- Store a larger file in smaller slack space areas




### standard file setup


















- Proper selection of slack space
  - Dumb first N files
  - Random random selection of files
  - Safe selects oldest (last modified) files
- Obfuscation
  - none no obfuscation
  - XOR key random 8 bit key
  - one-time pad use a known fixed file

Message = 100 bits

XOR Key = 100 bits

**Encrypted Message = 100 bits** 



# Improving Slack Space

 Perform statistical analysis against slack space information to locate anomalous patterns.

- Routinely clear slack space
  - Eraser
  - PGP Disk Wipe



### **Future Directions**

- Techniques
  - Cross-disciplinary tools
  - i.e. slacker, Meterpreter
- Availability
  - Actively researched, discussed, and distribution of tools
- Sophistication
  - Targeted research into anti-forensics
  - More brainpower is being directed this way



# Thank you for your time.

# Questions?

# Slides available @

http://www.metasploit.com/projects/antiforensics/